A Decentralized Chinese Military Could Reshape Global Power

A Decentralized Chinese Military Could Reshape Global Power

A recent report from the Rand Corporation suggests that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is contemplating a significant shift from its traditionally rigid, centralized command structure to a more decentralized and flexible model known as mission command. This potential change could significantly enhance the PLA’s operational effectiveness, compelling the United States and its allies to reassess long-standing military strategies that assume a slow and predictable Chinese military. The U.S. has often relied on the belief that, similar to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, a numerically superior adversary would be hindered by clumsy tactics and a rigid hierarchy. However, if China successfully implements this Western-style command philosophy, the PLA could become a more agile and resilient force.

The Concept of Mission Command

Mission command is a military doctrine that emphasizes decentralized execution of orders. Senior commanders provide their subordinates with a clear understanding of the mission’s objectives and intent, but they do not dictate the specific methods for achieving those goals. This approach empowers lower-level officers to exercise initiative and adapt to rapidly changing battlefield conditions without waiting for explicit instructions from higher headquarters. This philosophy has been a cornerstone of Western military success, famously employed by German forces in World War II and currently utilized by the Israel Defense Forces and the U.S. military. By fostering quick decision-making and adaptability, mission command enables forces to capitalize on opportunities and respond to threats more effectively than a rigid, top-down system.

A Delicate Balance for Beijing

For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the prospect of adopting mission command presents a significant dilemma. The CCP’s primary concern has always been maintaining absolute political control over the military, which it views as the armed wing of the party rather than the state. This has resulted in a system where political commissars share command with military officers at every level, ensuring loyalty to the party. A move towards decentralization could be perceived as a threat to this control, as empowering junior officers could lead to actions not directly sanctioned by the central leadership. Chinese President Xi Jinping has already demonstrated concerns about the military’s reliability through repeated anti-corruption purges of senior officers. Thus, any reform would have to navigate the inherent tension between enhancing military performance and ensuring unwavering party loyalty.

Potential Paths and Implications for the U.S.

The Rand report outlines three possible scenarios for the PLA’s adoption of mission command. The most concerning for the U.S. would be the full-scale implementation of the doctrine, which would create a more resilient PLA, less vulnerable to American tactics that target command and control centers. 

A second possibility is the partial adoption of mission command, where elite units, such as special forces or naval vessels operating far from their home bases, are granted greater autonomy. In contrast, sensitive forces in areas like cyber and space remain under tight control. However, this hybrid approach could lead to inconsistent performance and potentially increase the risk of unauthorized aggression by empowered local commanders. 

The final option is that the CCP’s desire for control will ultimately outweigh the potential benefits, and the PLA will retain its current centralized structure. Regardless of the path chosen, the fact that these discussions are taking place within the PLA signals a significant moment. One of the report’s co-authors noted, advocates for mission command believe Beijing can achieve both decentralized execution and high levels of party control, a prospect that the U.S. military will be watching closely.